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. . . . As all six men were blind, neither of them could see the whole elephant and approached the
elephant from different directions. After encountering the elephant, each man proclaimed in
turn:
'O my brothers,' the first man at once cried out, 'it is as sure as I am wise that this elephant is
like a great mud wall baked hard in the sun.'
'Now, my brothers,' the second man exclaimed with a cry of dawning recognition, 'I can tell you
what shape this elephant is - he is exactly like a spear.' . . .
'Why, dear brothers, do you not see,' said the third man -- 'this elephant is very much like a
rope,' he shouted.
'Ha, I thought as much,' the fourth man declared excitedly, 'This elephant much resembles a
serpent.' . . .
'Good gracious, brothers,' the fifth man called out, 'even a blind man can see what shape the
elephant resembles most. Why he's mightily like a fan.'
At last, it was the turn of the sixth old fellow and he proclaimed,
'This sturdy pillar, brothers' mine, feels exactly like the trunk of a great areca palm tree.'**
For much of the twentieth century, the state’s position with respect to marriage and other
relationships between adults sparked little conversation in legal and political theory. Instead, the
state’s role in putting its seal of approval on marital relationships and discouraging other
relationships between adults was generally taken as an unquestioned fact. To the extent that the
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2state’s position on relationships between adults was raised at all, commentary centered on the
relative ease with which persons generally, or particular classes of persons could be married or
divorced,1 or the consequences of divorce.2 The legitimacy of the state’s involvement in and
support for marriage, itself, however, went largely undiscussed.
Recent legal, political and social events, however, have turned this state of affairs on its
head. The string of court decisions finding merit in same-sex marriage challenges, beginning
with the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr v. Lewin in 1994,3 and extending through the
Massachusetts Supreme Court’s decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,4 to
1 For example, in the period between the 1970s and the mid-1990s, a great number of law review articles focused on
the then occurring no-fault divorce revolution sweeping the states. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of
California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291 (1987); Thomas B. Marvell, Divorce Rates and the Fault
Requirement, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 543 (1989); Balancing Children’s Rights Into the Divorce Decision, 13 VT. L.
REV. 531 (1989); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath,
56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1987); Nora J. Lauerman, A Step Toward Enhancing Equality, Choice, and Opportunity to
Develop in Marriage and at Divorce, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 493 (1987).
A considerable amount of the literature on marriage and divorce during the 1980s and early 1990s also
focused on the right of members of particular groups to marry. Prison inmates were one of the groups that received
the most attention. See, e.g., Bradford L. Thomas, Restricting State Prisoners’ Due Process Rights: The Supreme
Court Demonstrates Its Loyalty to Judicial Restraint, 22 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 215 (1991); Jacqueline B.
DeOliveira, Marriage, Procreation, and the Prisoner: Should Reproductive Alternatives Survive During
Incarceration? 5 TOURO L. REV. 189 (1988); Virginia L. Hardwick, Punishing the Innocent: Unconstitutional
Restrictions on Prison Marriage and Visitation, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 275 (1985). The rights of those with HIV and
AIDS to marry also provoked conversation. See, e.g., Robert D. Goodman, In Sickness or in Health: The Right to
Marry and the Case of HIV Antibody Testing, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 87 (1988); The Constitutional Rights of AIDS
Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (1986). Immigrants’ rights to marry was also explored. See, e.g., Jesse I. Santana,
The Proverbial Catch-22: The Unconstitutionality of Section Five of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments
of 1986, 25 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (1988/1989); Vonnell C. Tingle, Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986:
Locking In By Locking Out? 27 J. FAM. L. 733 (1988/1989); Eileen P. Lynskey, Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986: Till Congress Do Us Part, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1087 (1987).
2 See, e.g., Theodore F. Haas, The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on Divorce, 66 N.C.
L. REV. 879 (1988); Michael Diehl, The Trust in Marital Law: Divisibility of a Beneficiary Spouse’s Interests on
Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1986); Michelle Dorsey Deis, Gross v. Gross: Ohio’s First Step Toward Allowing
Private Ordering of the Marital Relationship, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 235 (1986); Barb Mattei, Deficit Reduction Act:
Divorce Taxation, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 177 (1986); Helen A. Boyer, Equitable Interest in Enhanced Earning
Capacity: The Treatment of a Professional Degree at Dissolution—In Re Marriage of Washburn, 60 WASH L. REV.
431 (1985); Charles F. Basil, The Divisibility of Pension Interests on Divorce: The District of Columbia Ups the
Ante, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 1087 (1984).
3 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1994).
4 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
3today, as well as the continuing political reaction against these decisions,5 has fomented a
vigorous debate in legal and political theory regarding the state’s appropriate role in relationships
between adults. This debate has been spurred on, as well, by social developments, including the
Thus far, however, despite some success in courts, see, e.g., Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44; Goodridge, 798
N.E.2d at 941; Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (1999), only the state of Massachusetts, which began issuing
licenses to same-sex couples on May 17, 2004, currently permits same-sex marriage. See David W. Chen, Trenton
Court Considers Gay Marriage Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, at B8. Before Hawaii courts could strike down the
Hawaii law prohibiting same-sex marriage, the state’s citizens amended the Hawaii Constitution to allow the
legislature to prohibit same-sex marriage. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. Vermont legislators, meanwhile, adopted a civil
union statute that gives members of same-sex unions the same rights as marriage, but does not permit such couples
formally to marry. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2005). Meanwhile, challenges to same-sex marriage bans are
still working their way through the courts in other states, including California. See, e.g., Lockyer v. City and County
of San Francisco, 33 Cal. 4th 1055 (Cal. 2004); Kerrigan v. Connecticut, No. CV044001813, 2005 WL 834296
(Conn. Super.), 38 Conn. L. Rptr. 827 (Mar. 3, 2005); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2005);
Castle v. Washington, No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215 (Wash. Super., Sept. 7, 2004).
5 On the national level, concerns about state courts striking down same-sex marriage bans has led to the Defense of
Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199 (1996), which declares that no state must give effect to a same-sex
marriage celebrated in another state, and that the term “marriage” for purposes of federal law is confined to the
union of a man and woman. On the state level, these same concerns had caused 38 states, as of mid-2004 to adopt
their own laws forbidding the recognition of same-sex marriage celebrated in other states, four of them in their
respective state constitutions. ABA Section of Family Law, Working Group on Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions,
and Domestic Partnerships 9 (2004).
4increasing visibility of same-sex relationships,6 the mushrooming rates of single-parent families,7
and the growing number of couples who choose to remain childless.8
The resulting conversation among political and legal theorists has been complex. Many
in the conversation have argued that marriage should be extended to same-sex couples.9 Others
have argued that the state should retain the institution of marriage, but continue to restrict it to
6 The 2000 U.S. Census counted 601,209 same-sex unmarried partner households. This means that roughly 1% of
all couples sharing a household are same-sex. That is a 314% increase from the 1990 Census, although changes in
the manner of coding these responses probably led to significant undercounting in the earlier census. It is likely that
actual numbers are higher than even the 2000 Census reveals due to underreporting of these relationships. See
DAVID M. SMITH AND GARY J. GATES, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, GAY AND LESBIAN FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES:
SAME-SEX UNMARRIED PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS 2-3(2001), available at http:/www.urban.org/urlprint.cfm?ID=8425
(last visited December 20, 2005).
7 In 1960, nine percent of children lived in single-parent homes. By 1999, that figure rose to 27%. STEPHANIE
SADO AND ANGELA BAYER, POPULATION RESOURCE CENTER, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE CHANGING AMERICAN
FAMILY (2001), available at http://www.prcdc.org/summaries/family/family.html (last visited December 17, 2005).
The rise in single-parent families is attributable not only to increased divorce rates, but to an increase in the number
of families in which the parents were never married. The percentage of children born out of wedlock increased at an
accelerated pace beginning in the mid-1960s. Id. In 1970 there were about 400,000 births (out of 3.7 million total
births) to mothers who were unmarried; in 1990, that figure rose to 1.2 million. George Akerlof, Janet Yellen and
Michael Katz, An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q. J. OF ECON. 277, 285
(1996). During the same period, married women’s fertility rate declined. Id. Overall, almost one in every three
families with children is headed by a woman who has never been married. KRISTEN LUKER, DUBIOUS CONCEPTIONS:
THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE PREGNANCIES 103 (1996).
8 According to the Census Bureau's 1998 Current Population Survey, a greater percentage of women of all ages are
not having children. In that year, 5.7 million (or 18.4 percent) married women of childbearing age (defined by the
Census as between 15 and 44 years old) were childless. Amanda Bachu and Martin O’Conner, Fertility of American
Women, Current Population Reports, at http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p20-526.pdf. The National Center of
Health Statistics confirms that the percentage of women of childbearing age who define themselves as voluntarily
childless is generally on the rise: from 2.4 percent in 1982, to 4.3 percent in 1990, to 6.6 percent in 1995, to 6.2
percent in 2002 (the most recent year for which statistics are available). That amounts to 3.83 million women who
chose to forgo motherhood in 2002. National Center for Health Statistics, Fertility, Family Planning, and
Reproductive Health of U.S. Women: Data From the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth, 23 Vital and Health
Statistics 25, pg. 8 (Dec. 2005), at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_025.pdf.
9 See, e.g., Gregory Care, Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Long Overdue: The
Evolution of a “Sexual Orientation-Blind” Legal System in Maryland and the Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage,
35 U. BALT. L. REV. 73 (2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of
Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011 (2005), and, Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A
Step-By-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 641 (2000); Andrew Koppelman, Against
Blanket Interstate Nonrecognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 17 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 205 (2005), and, Same-Sex
Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998); Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act:
The Next Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684 (2004).
5heterosexual couples.10 Still others, including some gay rights advocates, believe that the state
has no legitimate business regulating adult relationships, and assert that the state should remove
itself completely from sanctioning marriage.11 Finally, even those who agree that the state
should support marriage disagree about the amount of financial, legal or social support that it
should offer these relationships.12
What explains these vastly disparate claims regarding the state’s position concerning
relationships between adults? And how should these very different views be resolved? I argue
here that commentators have reached such widely divergent results because they have tended to
focus on too narrow a range of goods at stake in these relationships. Relationships between
adults, however, implicate not just one or two, but a number of principles important to a liberal
democracy. And, to complicate matters further, some of these principles stand in tension with
one another. To derive the state’s policy on relationships between adults from consideration of
just one or two of the relevant goods at stake recalls the Indian story of the blind men who, on
encountering an elephant, all felt different parts of the animal and emerged with radically
different descriptions of the nature of the beast. It is only through an approach that recognizes
the multiplicity of goods at stake in the state’s approach to relationships between adults, and that
10 See, e.g., COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE MARRIAGE CRISIS IN NORTH
AMERICA (2005).
11 See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE
(2003); MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH (2004); Judith Stacey, Toward Equal Regard For Marriage and
Other Imperfect Intimate Affiliations, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 331 (2003). Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter
Less: The ALI Domestic Partner Principles Are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353 (2004).
12 Compare, e.g., Laura S. Adams, Privileging the Privileged? Child Well-Being As a Justification for State
Support of Marriage, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 881 (2005); William C. Duncan, The State Interests in Marriage, 2 AVE
MARIA L. REV. 153 (2004); Phoebe G. Silag, To Have, to Hold, to Receive Public Assistance: TANF and Marriage
Promotion Policies, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUSTICE 413 (2003); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Does Marriage Make People
Good or Do Good People Marry? 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 889 (2005).
6seeks to ameliorate the tension among these goods, that a workable approach appropriate to a
liberal democracy can be fashioned.
My hope in this essay is to offer such a workable approach. In Part I, I consider four
prominent entries in the debate over the state’s treatment of relationships between adults. The
first two of these views argue that the state should eliminate civil marriage: one of these
arguments is from Martha Fineman, one of the foremost feminist legal scholars in the United
States; the other is from Michael Warner, a leading queer theorist. The other pair of entries
argue in favor of the state retaining a privileged status for marriage: these include William
Galston, a widely-respected liberal theorist who also served as a domestic policy advisor for
President Clinton; and the Council on Family Law,13 an organization chaired by Harvard Law
School Professor Mary Ann Glendon. I argue that each pair of theorists reaches disparate
conclusions from the other pair because they focus on different goods important to a liberal
democracy. I contend that there are particular elements of each of these four positions that a
vigorous liberal democratic polity must seek to draw upon – although others that should be
rejected, as well.
In Part II, I discuss the various goods and principles important to a liberal democracy
implicated in relationships between adults. I then lay out an approach that seeks to ameliorate
the tension among these principles. In this approach, the state continues to provide a civil route
to formalize relationships among adults. But since many types of caretaking relationships
produce important public goods, it allows formalization of a broader range of relationships than
the couples now permitted to marry by states. Further this approach allows the state to provide
some privileges to these relationships. Because it is mindful that these privileges conflict with
13 The Council on Family Law is jointly sponsored by the Institute for American Values, the Institute for Marriage
and Public Policy, and the Institute for the Study of Marriage, Law, and Culture.
7other important goods, however, this approach limits the permissible extent of these privileges.
Finally, this approach requires that the state actively seek to remedy the negative consequences
to public goods associated with relationships among adults – particularly increased gender
inequality; increased economic inequality; and the possibility that close caretaking relationships
will cause their participants to turn away from civic life.
In the closing parts of the essay, I consider two difficult issues that the state must
confront with respect to relationships among adults. In Part III, I discuss the form that state
recognition of such relationships should take. Specifically, should the state categorize all
relationships between adults together under a banner such as “domestic partnership,” and
therefore give the same rights and privileges to all such relationships? Or should such
relationships be categorized separately, and privileges accorded, to each separate type at issue?
In the latter case, the state would presumably retain a civil status for conjugal relationships such
as marriage, but also recognize other forms of adult-adult relationships, such as domestic
partnerships between friends who cohabitate. Finally, in Part IV, I consider the difficult issue of
the extent to which the state may legitimately seek to encourage two-parent families over single-
parent families and marital relationships over other relationships between adults.
The account that I develop in this essay is unabashedly liberal, in the sense that it
assumes the equal worth of all human beings, the importance of limits on government, and
respect for individual rights.14 It takes seriously, however, the recent insights of political
theorists who argue that liberalism cannot and should not be completely neutral with respect to
14 I use the term “liberal” throughout this article to refer to the Anglo-American line of political thought stretching
from John Locke through John Stuart Mill and on to such contemporary thinkers as John Rawls, whose work
focuses on the importance of liberty, self-government, and equal rights for citizens. This use of the term is therefore
broader than the use of the term “liberal” in common parlance to refer to those who hold political beliefs at the
opposite end of the political spectrum from conservatives. Under my use of the term, both thinkers such as John
Rawls, who might qualify as a liberal under common usage, and Robert Nozick, who might be considered a political
conservative, are “liberals.”
8different versions of the good life, and that a liberal polity must strive to further a broader range
of goods than the individualistic versions of liberty and justice that have often been associated
with it.15 And it seeks to combine those insights with those of feminist theorists who have
pointed out that the inevitability of dependency, and the consequent need for caretaking, must be
accounted for in structuring our common lives together.16 Put another way, although a liberal
democracy should give significant pride of place to individual liberty and justice, it must also
pay attention to an array of other goods and principles relating to human dependency and human
development that are necessary to a robust democracy, and which have been too often excluded
from standard liberal accounts.17 In my view, it is only by considering this richer range of goods
and principles that the appropriate relationship between families and the state can be brought into
focus.
15 See, e.g., WILLIAM GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1991) (arguing that a liberal state cannot and should not be neutral with respect to all versions of the good); AMY
GUTMANN, Undemocratic Education, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 79-80 (Nancy Rosenblum ed., 1989)
(stating that is “dangerous” to permit the policies of the state be dictated only according to the “best interests of its
individual members,” and defending an alternative ideal of “collective self-determination—an ideal of citizens
sharing in deliberate determination of the future shape of their society”); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE 10 (1999) (articulating an expansive form of liberalism that “begins with the idea of the equal worth of
human beings as such, in virtue of their basic human capacities for choice and reasoning”; THOMAS SPRAGENS,
CIVIC LIBERALISM: REFLECTIONS ON OUR DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 150(1999); see also Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic
Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls, 105(3) ETHICS 468, 487 (1995).
16 See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 54 (positing that, because dependency is an inevitable part of the human
condition, “the political and policy questions should focus on an optimal reallocation of responsibility for
dependency across societal institutions”); EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND
DEPENDENCY 188(1999) (arguing in favor of a social and political commitment to meet dependency needs); JOAN
TRONTO, MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC OF CARE 157-180 (1993) (arguing that
dependency and “care” are fundamental parts of human life, and, consequently, that the political framework must be
reformulated to incorporate them); Eva Feder Kittay, Taking Dependency Seriously: The Family and Medical Leave
Act Considered in Light of the Social Organization of Dependency Work and Gender Equality, 10 HYPATIA 8, 24-25
(1995) (emphasis in original) (“What is required is that the public understanding of social cooperation include
respect for the importance of caring for one another and the value of receiving care and giving care. It then becomes
a matter of political justice for basic institutions to make provisions for and facilitate satisfactory dependency
relations.”).
17 As Charles Taylor says about modern thought generally, “[w]e have read so many goods out of our official story,
we have buried their power so deep beneath layers of philosophical rationale, that they are in danger of stifling. Or
rather, since they are our goods, human goods, we are stifling.” CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE
MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY 520 (1989)(emphasis in original).
9I. Theoretical Positions in the Existing Conversation
In the discussion over the state’s treatment of relationships between adults, recent debate
has focused on the controversy between those who believe that the state has no business with
respect to relationships between adults, and those who argue precisely the opposite. In this
section, I consider the arguments of theorists on both sides of this issue. I argue that both sides
point to important goods at stake in the state’s treatment of such relationships, but that these
goods cannot be considered independently. Instead, they must be balanced against other
important goods and principles at stake in the state’s treatment of these relationships.
A. Fineman and Warner — The Case Against Marriage
No feminist theorist has taken a stronger stance against civil marriage than Martha
Fineman.18 Current public policy, she argues, is based on the myth that families should be
autonomous. Because the marital family, according to popular thought, is seen as a strong and
independent unit, it is conceived as representing the ideal that the state should be promoting.19
As a result of the belief that the marital form should be encouraged because it is autonomous,
Fineman points out with irony, married couples receive hundreds, if not thousands, of subsidies
and privileges from the state that are unavailable to other, supposedly less autonomous family
forms.20
18 Fineman’s views on this issue have received significant critical debate. See, e.g.,MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, Just
Marriage: On the Public Importance of Public Unions, in JUST MARRIAGE 14-16 (2004) (criticizing Fineman’s
advocating a contractual approach to relationships between adults), Elizabeth Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation, and
Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 252(2004) (responding to Fineman’s call to
eliminate civil marriage).
19 FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 57.
20 Id. at 104-05. See also TERRENCE R. DOUGHERTY, NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE POL’Y INST.,
ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE UNDER FEDERAL AND MASSACHUSETTS LAW 4-14, (2004) (listing marital
benefits under federal and Massachusetts law), available at
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/EconomicCosts.pdf (last visitedNovember 12, 2005).
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Fineman contends that this policy of supporting the marital family is misguided on
several grounds. First, she contends that complete autonomy is possible for no one, including
married couples. In contemporary society, everyone exists within a web of institutions that
provide for at least some of their needs. Because of this, Fineman argues, the state’s pursuit of
autonomy should be abandoned in favor of insuring that human needs are humanely and justly
met for all citizens, not just those who live in families.21
Fineman also criticizes other justifications for the multitude of benefits currently awarded
to married couples. Insofar as the state focuses on the marital family to support childrearing,
Fineman contends, it is sorely out-of-touch: large portions of the population raise children out of
wedlock, while, at the same time, many married couples choose to remain childless.22 A state
that truly seeks to support the welfare of children should therefore support childrearing in all the
contexts in which it occurs, not just for children whose parents are married.23 And insofar as the
state subsidizes the marital family because it represents the majority’s views of how people
should order their lives, Fineman contends, its actions are illegitimate: in a diverse and secular
liberal society, the state should not privilege one form of affiliation over others simply because
that affiliation better comports with the private morality of the majority of citizens.24 On top of
that, Fineman points out, the state’s current support for the institution of marriage overlooks
significant problems with that institution, most obviously that it is an institution to which (at least
until recently, and in most places still) only heterosexual couples are admitted, and that it is rife
21 FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 199, 285.
22 Id. at 67, 110-112.
23 Id. at xvii.
24 Id. at 105.
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with sex inequality. On this latter point, she argues that public policy that encourages marriage
for the sake of children demonstrates the state’s willingness to sacrifice women’s interests for
children’s.25
Fineman argues that instead of subsidizing a particular type of family, i.e., the marital
family, the liberal state should subsidize the particular functions that it has a legitimate interest in
supporting, in whatever relationships these functions take place.26 This means, for Fineman,
that the state should not seek to further its interest in childrearing through privileging the marital
family grouping, as it currently does; instead, it should subsidize the caretaker-dependent
relationship directly in whatever type of configuration in which it occurs.27 In contrast, Fineman
argues that the state has no legitimate stake in furthering relationships between capable adults.
In her words:
Why create policies based on a seriously weakened family affiliation – the
marital couple – when it is really caretaking that we as a society should want to
ensure? Society has a responsibility to adjust to these changing patterns of
behavior by guaranteeing that the emerging family forms are supported in
performing the tasks we would have them assume.28
As a result, Fineman asserts, the state should eliminate civil marriage as a legal institution.29 In
the new regime she proposes, legal relationships between adults would be governed by private
25 Id. at 88.
26 Id. at 67 (“It is time to build our family policy around these emerging norms, to focus not on form but on the
function we want families to perform.”); see also id. at 68, 105-107 (arguing that the focus needs to shift away from
the historic, symbolic form of the marital relationship and towards the role or function that the institution of the
family is seeking to serve in society).
27 Id. at 67; see also id. at xix, 108, 138-41.
28 Id. at 67.
29 See id. at 122 (“I argue that for all relevant and appropriate societal purposes, we do not need marriage and we
should abolish it as a legal category. I argue that we should transfer the social and economic subsidies and privilege
that marriage now receives to a new family core connection – that of the caretaker-dependent.”).
12
contracts negotiated between them. This would leave marriage as a purely religious institution
for those couples who choose to enter it, with no civil consequences.
Fineman’s view that the state should eliminate civil marriage bears a strong affinity to
arguments made by queer theorists, most prominently, Michael Warner. Warner contends that
the gay community’s current push for same-sex marriage runs the risk of requiring “the
wholesale repudiation of queer culture’s best insights on intimate relations, sex, and the politics
of stigma.”30 He argues that the early years of the gay rights movement in the United States
developed a vision of queer politics centered, among other things, on the recognition that a
diverse range of sexual and intimate relationships is worthy of respect. That movement,
according to Warner, originally sought to develop unprecedented types of commonality and
intimacy. In doing so, it rejected the norms of straight culture that granted “legitimacy to some
kinds of consensual sex but not others [and] to confer respectability on some people’s sexuality
but not others’.”31
This original vision of queer politics, Warner contends, is undercut by the current
advocacy in the gay community for same-sex marriage. Warner argues that marriage is the
means through which the state has historically sought to privilege and promote a particular,
monogamous model of heterosexual sexuality, and to stigmatize all other models as morally
tainted.32 According to Warner, this represents the blatant imposition of the majority’s view of
what is morally proper on the minority. Warner resists the notion that the state should serve as
an instrument of moral judgment, granting “legitimacy to some kinds of consensual sex but not
30 Michael Warner, Normal and Normaller: Beyond Gay Marriage, 5 GLQ: A J. OF GAY AND LESBIAN STUD. 119,
122 (1999).
31 Id. at 123.
32 Id.
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others or to confer respectability on some people’s sexuality but not others.”33 He argues that
instead of calling for same-sex marriage, gays and others who perceive themselves as queer
should be striving for “[t]he ability to imagine and cultivate forms of the good life that do not
conform to the dominant pattern.”34
B. Galston and the Council on Family Law – The Case for Marriage
Fineman’s and Warner’s arguments against marriage stand in stark contrast to arguments
favoring marriage from William Galston, as well as from the Council of Family Law. In the
context of condemning out-of-wedlock births for their negative consequences on children,
Galston argues against the view that marriage is a failed social institution that the state should
abandon. In his words, marriage:
is not a panacea, but it is a vital part of the solution. In at least a majority of cases,
marriage can make a positive contribution, not only to the well-being of children, but also
to the well-being of their parents.
Does this represent nostalgia? Does it imply the reaffirmation of patriarchy? On the
contrary: it means the simple recognition that for economic, emotional and
developmental reasons, marriage is the most promising institution yet devised for raising
children and forming caring, competent, responsible adults. . . . I am deeply skeptical
that the abolition of marriage, with all of its imperfections, can possibly yield better lives,
or a better society for our children.35
Despite Galston’s having served as domestic policy advisor for the Clinton
administration, his view that the state should promote the marital relationship bears a significant
resemblance to the policies advocated by the socially conservative Council on Family Law,
although some of its rationales vary from Galston’s. In its recent report, “The Future of Family
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Galston, supra note 10, at 323.
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Law: Law and the Marriage Crisis in North America,”36 the Council argues that marriage should
continue to be the state’s privileged institution for relationships between adults. That report
argues that “at its core marriage has always had something to do with societies’ recognition of
the fundamental importance of the sexual ecology of human life: humanity is male and female,
men and women often have sex, babies often result, and those babies, on average, seem to do
better when their mother and father cooperate in their care.”37 This understanding of marriage as
the promotion of a stable framework for biological parents procreating and raising children, the
report argues, should continue to be promoted by the state.
The report therefore decries proposals like Fineman’s and Warner’s that argue for state
disengagement from marriage. Such arguments, the Council asserts, sounding a chord similar to
Galston’s, “den[y] the state’s legitimate and serious interest in marriage as our most important
child-protecting social institution and as an institution that helps protect and sustain liberal
democracy.”38 The Council also argues against proposals that seek to expand the category of
relationships recognized by the state beyond married couples. According to the Council, doing
so would unwisely “celebrate relationship diversity” to the exclusion of fostering the important
goals that have traditionally been supported in marriage.39 Further, to treat relationships that
have not been formalized as the equivalent of marriage, the Council argues, would not only
undercut couples’ own intent regarding the effects of their relationships, it would also fail to
encourage couples to enter into formal commitments, and would therefore miss an important
36 COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 10.
37 Id. at 13.
38 Id. at 6.
39 Id. at 40.
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opportunity for the state to encourage the stability of these relationships and the welfare of any
children who result from them.40
Finally, the Council also argues against expanding marriage to same-sex couples.41 To
do so, the report contends, would “strip[] all remaining remnants of sex, gender, and
procreativity from the public, shared meaning of marriage.”42 It would therefore, according to
the report, fail to recognize “the specificity of marriage as a form of life struggling with the
unique challenges of bonding sexual difference and caring for children who are the products of
unions.”43
C. Assessing the State’s Interest in Horizontal Relationships
How should we evaluate these diametrically opposed claims regarding the state’s correct
posture toward marriage and other relationships between adults? In my view, each of these
positions focuses on important goods and principles that a vigorous liberal democratic polity
40 Id. at 24-25.
41 In doing so, the Council appears to depart from Galston’s position. In a recent article, Galston at least implicitly
suggests that he supports states’ freedom to expand marriage beyond its current boundaries:
It remains to be seen whether the evolving constitutional jurisprudence will ultimately strike down
prohibitions on same-sex marriage. The push for a federal constitutional amendment defining marriage as
the union of one man and one woman reflects social conservatives' fears about just such an outcome. By
contrast, many advocates of gay marriage would be satisfied with a state-by-state approach, which would
inevitably yield long-term differences among the states on this matter. The debate over the right of public
authorities to enforce uniformity on the institutions of civil society is far less settled. I agree with [Peter]
Schuck when he insists that "the distinction between public and private morality, between the values laws
should mandate and those it should leave to the disparate choices of a diverse civil society, lies at the core
of a liberal society," and that "the diversity that flows from the[] exercise of individual freedom is
presumptively valid." I also agree with Schuck's application of this principle to the freedom of association:
“[I]f valuing diversity in a liberal society means anything, it means assuring people's freedom to form
exclusive groups that embrace unpopular beliefs in ways permitted by the Constitution and without undue
interference by the law."
William Galston, Liberal Government, Civil Society, and the Rule of Law, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 19 (2005)).
42 COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 9, at 26.
43 Id. at 21.
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should seek to draw upon. Yet none of them steps back enough to consider the full range of
goods and principles at stake.
Fineman is certainly right that autonomy is possible for no one, adults as well as children,
and that the state should abandon the quest for the pursuit of autonomy in favor of insuring that
human needs are met with justice and dignity. Yet, precisely contrary to Fineman, this gives the
state an important stake in relationships between adults.44 As care theorists have made
abundantly clear,45 and as Fineman herself argues, 46 it is not just children and those with
disabilities who need care: all humans need care, even generally-healthy adults. And as our
society is organized, some large portion of that care will come, if it comes at all, from other
adults with whom we share close relationships. In such “horizontal” relationships,47 neither
person is always the caretaker nor the dependent, as they are, for example, in relationships
between adults and young children. Instead, adult-adult relationships are, at their best, marked
by what might be called “reciprocal dependency,” in which each partner sometimes performs
caretaking activities for the other and meets the other’s dependency needs; in turn, their partner
does the same for them at other times. These relationships, when they function well, involve
countless small acts in which each adult takes care of the other: one partner makes the other a
44 See also Linda McClain, Intimate Affiliation and Democracy: Beyond Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 414-
15(2003) (“To do [otherwise] seems to undervalue adult-adult interdependency and to miss the important facilitative
role government may play in supporting such forms of adult affiliation”); Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17
WIS. WOMEN’S L. J. 57, 60-61 (2002).
45 See KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR, supra note 13; Tronto, supra note 16.
46 See FINEMAN, supra note 10, at xvii, 35-36.
47 I use the term “horizontal relationships,” to refer to relationships among generally able adults. The term
distinguishes these relationships from such “vertical” relationships as those between parents and children, in which
one person is the caretaker and the other the dependent.
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cup of coffee when they get up; the other drops off dry-cleaning on the way to work; one runs to
the store for cold medicine when the other is sick; and so on.48
This sort of caretaking, at its best, produces a society in which adults are knit into webs
of care that help them to support one another. In these webs, one partner’s cold doesn’t develop
into something worse because the other partner insists on taking them to see a doctor. Moreover,
such caretaking helps keep families stable so that partners are there for one another at times
when one of them has greater needs, such as periods of disability. The state has an important
interest in these relationships because of its interest in the dignity of its citizens, not to mention
their health and well-being.
By the same token, Warner focuses on only a limited range of the goods at stake. He is
on firm ground in recognizing that the issue of relationships among adults implicates the
important values of freedom and diversity. He also, along with Fineman, properly recognizes
that in a liberal democracy committed to freedom the state should not be used as a vehicle to
promote the majority’s own comprehensive views with respect to citizens’ private lives. Yet he
fails to recognize the public goods that horizontal relationships implicate—including the
caretaking that adults require, and the important value of human dignity that this furthers.
Turning to the other side of this debate, both Galston and the Council on Family Law also
point to important goods to which a liberal democracy must attend. The liberal democratic state,
as both Galston and the Council argue, should be able to privilege some relationships over others
for public ends. And certainly creating a stable environment for children is such an end: all other
48 This is not to say that in all, or even most, horizontal relationships between women and men the carework is
evenly divided. Studies have repeatedly shown that women spend significantly more time caretaking than men, even
when women work outside the home. See, e.g., ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING
PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 271-78 (1989); see also Katharine Kay Baker, Taking Care of Our
Daughters, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1495, 1512 n.63 (1997). There is some suggestion, however, that the deficit
between men and women has been decreasing slightly. See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881,
1906-07 (2000).
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things being equal, stable family relationships are better for children than unstable or nonexistent
relationships. Further, while many of the greater difficulties associated with single-parent
families can be attributed to lack of adequate legal and social supports,49 having the emotional
and financial resources of two loving adults available to a child, again, all other things being
equal,50 is better than having the resources of just one. Both Galston and the Council also make
valuable points about the important role that the state can have through formalizing and
privileging relationships such as marriage in creating an environment that fosters the caretaking
of citizens generally, as well as children specifically.
In focusing on the state’s promoting marriage (and, in the Council’s case, solely
heterosexual marriage), however, they too narrowly define the relationships that should be
accorded such privileges by the state.51 The Council argues that advocates who support the
state’s awarding privileges to a broader category of relationships than marriage miss “the
specificity of marriage as a form of life struggling with the unique challenges of bonding sexual
difference and caring for children who are the products of unions.”52 Yet the Council gives no
convincing reason why the disparate issues of “bonding sexual difference” and “caring for
49 See, e.g., Nancy Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 19, 34-35(1995) (documenting
ways that lack of social and economic support for single parent families creates problems). 
50 The caveat of “all other things being equal” is a significant one. I am not arguing that having two parents who
are unhappy stay together is better for children than having them separate. I am making the more modest claim that,
for a child, having two happy parents living together is generally better than having one happy parent because of the
extra emotional, caretaking, and financial resources they can contribute. Moreover, having two parents who live
together happily is, all other things being equal, generally better for a child than having two parents who live happily
apart. See William Galston, Causes of Declining Well-Being Among U.S. Children, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND
FAMILY 299-303 (Martha Nussbaum and David Estlund eds., 1997) (summarizing research findings).
51 To be fair, while Galston argues in favor of shoring up marriage and discouraging divorce, he would extend
other policy measures that he advocates such as making work and family more compatible, and offering tax breaks
to many types of families, not simply families headed by a married couple. Elaine Kamarck and William Galston,
Putting Children First: A Progressive Policy for the 1990s, in MANDATE FOR CHANGE 153 (Will Marshall and
Martin Schram eds., 1992). See also Galston, supra note 10, at 317-22 (arguing for a more progressive tax policy
that better eases the burdens placed on working families).
52 COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 9, at 21.
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children” should both be required in every marriage, and, indeed, why the state shouldn’t make
available, as well, other packages that promote other legitimate public ends.53
Indeed, the Council’s arguments against same-sex marriage miss the mark on several
counts. While the Council is certainly right that it is generally heterosexual relationships in
which children will arrive unplanned, this is not a reason to exclude same-sex couples from
receiving state privileges. The Council argues that marriage is a superior family arrangement for
both children who are unplanned as well as planned. Many same-sex couples, like many
heterosexual couples, plan to have children. And the children of these same-sex parents, like the
children of opposite-sex parents, are benefited by the stability of their parents’ relationships.
Given this, it makes sense for the state to seek to stabilize these relationships with the same
supports that the Council argues will work so well with opposite-sex couples.
More than that, the state’s interest in ensuring that adults receive care also militates in
favor of extending relationship privileges to same-sex couples. While the Council criticizes
those who seek to extend the state’s support beyond heterosexual marriage on the ground that
53 While both heterosexuality and procreation were certainly conceived as central to traditional marriage, see, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 605 (Mass. 1862) ( stating that “[t]he great object of marriage in a
civilized and Christian community is to secure the existence and permanence of the family relation, and to insure the
legitimacy of offspring”), at least the procreative purpose of marriage has been, if not quite eclipsed, then at least
demoted from its spot of sole star billing to costar alongside the companionate and caretaking aspects of marriage.
For example, older American cases restricted annulment for fraud in entering marriage to misrepresentations going
to the “essentials” of marriage, conceived in terms of duties connected with consortium and fertility. See, e.g., id.
However, more recently, courts have broadened the fraud for which annulment will be granted more generally for
misrepresentations critical to inducing the unplanning partner to marry. As stated in Kober v. Kober:
[T]he fraud [required for annulment] need no longer “necessarily concern what is commonly called the
essential of the marriage relation – the rights and duties connected with cohabitation and consortium
attached by law to the marital status. Any fraud is adequate which is “material to that degree that, had it
not been practiced, the party deceived would not have consented to the marriage” and is “of such nature as
to deceive an ordinarily prudent person.” Although it is not enough to show merely that one partner
married for money and the other was disappointed . . . and the decisions upon the subject of annulment
have not always been uniform, there have been circumstances where misrepresentations of love and
affection, with intention to make a home, were held sufficient . . .
211 N.E.2d 817, 819 (N.Y. 1965); see also, 389 N.E.2d 1143 (Ill. 1979).
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these policy advocates too narrowly focus on “such values as commitment, mutual support and
the rest” in the absence of childrearing,54 the importance of mutual support and related goods
offer powerful reasons for the state to privilege relationships that promote these goods, whether
or not they further all the other values that the Council believes are crucial to the state’s
protecting marriage.
Finally, although the Council is right that women have, for a variety of biological and
social reasons, been more vulnerable than men historically with respect to both unplanned
pregnancies and childrearing, limiting marriage to heterosexual couples for this reason would be
unwise. To the contrary, to the extent that homosexual relationships do not replicate these same
patterns of vulnerability, 55 the state has grounds to encourage same-sex relationships rather than
deny them recognition and rights. Further, the Council’s insistence that marriage is an institution
designed to protect vulnerable women flouts the Supreme Court’s counsel in cases such as
Frontiero v. Richardson that the state should not rely on overbroad or outmoded sex
stereotypes.56
In advocating state support for marriage but not other relationship among adults, both
Galston and the Council too quickly dismiss other principles important to liberal democracy that
militate against the state privileging such a limited range of relationships. The most important of
these alternative principles is distribution based on need. Because of economies of scale, adults
in live-in relationships generally have an easier time financially than those who live alone.57
54 COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 9, at 21.
55 See Linda McClain, The Liberal Future of Relational Feminism: Robin West’s Caring for Justice, 24 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 477, 510 (1999) (citing studies showing that generally lesbian couples do not organize their
relationship on a provider-homemaker model).
56 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-87(1973).
57 See, e.g., ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE
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Distributing resources to adults in relationships therefore is generally a regressive measure based
on need. Further, insofar as two-parent families have particular advantages that make them more
conducive to rearing healthy, stable children than single-parent families, distributing privileges
to dual-parent families may also be regressive based on need.58 As Judith Stacey argues, “The
more eggs and raiments our society chooses to place in the family baskets of the married, the
hungrier and shabbier will be the lives of the vast numbers of adults and dependents who,
whether by fate, misfortune or volition will remain outside the gates.”59
A clear recognition of the limits of both the state’s and individuals’ capacity to encourage
marital relationships also cuts against distributing societal privileges based on marital status.
Taking first limitations on the state’s capacity, it must be recognized that the state has only
limited ability to help citizens acquire and sustain healthy caretaking relationships. While it can
establish certain institutional preconditions and incentives for couples to make relationships
work,60 ultimately whether or not healthy relationships will develop and be sustained has a great
WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 150 (2001)(demonstrating that “two households are much more expensive than
one”).
58 The simple fact of distributing goods to families with children, however, is not regressive based on need. As
Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi demonstrate, having a child is now the best indicator of whether
someone will end up in financial collapse. In their words, “married couples with children are twice as likely as
childless couples to file for bankruptcy. They’re seventy-five percent more likely to be late paying their bills. And
they’re also far more likely to face foreclosure on their homes.” ELIZABETH WARREN AND AMELIA WARREN TYAGI,
THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING (2003).
59 Judith Stacey, Toward Equal Regard for Marriage and Other Imperfect Affiliations, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 331,
344 (2003). Stacey adds: “In my view, this is an unacceptably steep and undemocratic social price for whatever
marginal increases in marital stability might be achieved for those admitted to the charmed circle . . . ” Id..
60 For example, poverty is significantly correlated with divorce, as are problems associated with poverty, such as
homelessness and drug addiction. Social scientists who study the phenomenon believe that some of the correlation
between poverty and divorce is actually a causal relationship – in other words, poverty leads to divorce. See
generally Marsha Garrison, Reviving Marriage: Can We and Should We?, Address at the International Society of
Family Law Conference (July 19-23, 2005)(on file with author). Given this, an effective way for the state to
increase the stability of intimate relationships may be indirectly through antipoverty measures and other institutional
supports for the poor rather than through direct measures to promote institutions such as marriage. Such indirect
measures would also harmonize rather than conflict with the principle of distributing resources based on need.
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deal to do with characteristics of the individuals involved that are beyond the state’s reach to
affect, and dumb luck – for example, who individuals happen to meet at what particular times.
The state could, of course, still provide such sufficient financial incentives that people would
enter into and remain in relationships in which they were miserable and in which little healthy
caretaking occurred. Doing so, however, would not further the goods that the state should be
seeking to further.
With respect to the issue of individuals’ own capacity to enter into and maintain
relationships, it must be recognized that although personal attributes and behavior have some
part to play in the success of an individual’s relationships, many factors that affect success are
simply beyond the individual’s control. For example, one partner may simply decide that he or
she doesn’t love the other partner any more and leave, with no fault on the part of the other
partner, and no change in the partner’s behavior. Accordingly, considerations of fairness militate
against distributing privileges based on the success of a person’s relationships, when this success
has little relation to merit or effort and an inverse relation to need.
In sum, Fineman, Warner, Galston and the Council on Family Law all reach the relatively
black-and-white conclusions about the state’s position on marriage that each reaches because
they ignore important goods and principles at stake with respect to this issue. Considering all
these goods and principles together yields a more complicated—but ultimately a more
satisfying—picture of what the state’s role should be with respect to adults’ relationships.
II. A Liberal Democratic Approach to Relationships Between Adults
In Part I, I explored several prominent theoretical positions with respect to the state’s role
in intimate relationships. None of these positions, I argued, considered the complex array of
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goods and principles at stake in these relationships. In this Part, I lay out an approach that takes
into account this array of important interests.
To begin sorting out these matters, let me point out that there are actually two separate
but related issues that must be considered with respect to the state’s approach to relationships.
The first issue is whether the state should recognize relationships between adults for the purpose
of assigning rights and responsibilities between these adults. The second is whether the state
should privilege relationships between adults, in the sense that those who participate in these
relationships should receive either benefits from or rights against the state or third parties that
they would not otherwise receive. I argue that both of these issues should be answered in the
affirmative, although the first issue is an easier one to answer than the second.
A. State Recognition Of Adult-Adult Relationships
When it comes to whether the state should recognize relationships between adults for the
purpose of assigning rights and responsibilities between the parties, the answer seems to me to be
clearly “yes.” The interdependent nature of intimate relationships between adults, particularly
when they are long-term, creates a series of issues regarding rights and responsibilities that are
best addressed through laws that, at a minimum, establish a fair default position in the absence of
an express agreement between parties to the relationship. Without such default rules, this
interdependence can create large inequities and injustices both during and, particularly, at the
end of these relationships. For the state to do otherwise, as Mary Shanley recognizes, would
abandon the state’s interest in securing justice and equality in these relationships.61
Martha Fineman, of course, argues that considerations of justice and equality dictate the
opposite conclusion—state disengagement. According to Fineman:
61 Shanley, supra note 16, at 16.
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If people want their relationships to have consequences, they should bargain for them,
and this is as true with sexual affiliates as with others who interact in complex, ongoing
interrelationships, such as employers and employees. This would mean that sexual
affiliates (formerly labeled husband and wife) would be regulated by the terms of their
individualized agreements, with no special rules governing fairness and no unique review
or monitoring of the negotiation process.62
She asserts that the state’s withdrawal from regulating adult-adult relationships “would mean that
we are taking gender equality seriously.”63 In suggesting that a contractual regime will result in
fair and equal agreements between parties involved in intimate relationships, however, Fineman
glosses over serious difficulties. First she fails to take into account the ways in which those
entering into a relationship based on affective ties may not be looking out after their own
interests in opposition to the other person’s (and that the state may not want to encourage them to
be solely self-regarding). As a result, a “sexual affiliate” may agree to an unfair contract.
Furthermore, the course of lives and relationships are often so difficult to predict that contracts
entered into ex ante may not fairly and justly resolve what occurs ex post. In addition, in a
regime of contract, those in a weaker bargaining position – traditionally women – will likely
negotiate less favorable terms for themselves that will lead to inequality both in the course of the
relationship and also when and if it ends.
And in this regime, even those who negotiate unfavorable contracts may be the lucky
ones compared to those who negotiate no contracts. For some, this will be because they cannot
afford a lawyer; for others, this will be because the motivation to express one’s love publicly,
which many would say is their motivation to enter marriage,64 would not similarly impel them to
62 FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 134.
63 Id.
64 See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 798 N.E.2d 941, 954-55 (Mass. 2003) (quoting Griswold v.
Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“Civil marriage is at once a deeply personal commitment to another human
being and a highly public celebration of the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family. It is
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enter into a contract to protect themselves against their partner. If and when these relationships
end, the partners would have no contract claims against one another. Existing, albeit imperfect,
status-based protections that are currently available to those divorcing, such as the right to
equitable distribution of property and alimony, would be nonexistent in such a regime. This
would particularly hurt those who devote more energy and care to the relationship than to
financial pursuits – again, likely women – since they would have no automatic claim to income
earned by their partners through the joint efforts of the family.65
A regime in which the state recognized relationships among adults for the purpose of
apportioning rights and obligations among them therefore furthers the ends of fairness and
justice. Of course, such rights and obligations could be assigned to couples based on the
functional status of their relationship, without the state having to provide civil avenues to
formalize these relationships ex ante. For example, the rights and responsibilities that the
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution66 now seek to apply to
unmarried cohabitants could, in an era in which civil marriage and other formalized
commitments between adults were eliminated, be applied to all couples. Under such an
approach, what would matter in assigning such rights would be the couple’s functional
characteristics – how long they lived together, whether they had children together, etc. – rather
than whether they had formalized their relationship. For example, more property sharing might
an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects.”).
65 It might be argued, however, that although some individuals who enter into conjugal relationships may fare worse
in the event of a break-up, if status based marriages were eliminated, many other individuals would fare better
because, in the absence of such recognition from the state, they would cease to enter into conjugal relationships.
And certainly Fineman and other commentators have suggested that most women would fare better if they avoided
entering into marriage or marriage-like relationships with men altogether. Whether or not this is the case, my strong
hunch is that ending civil recognition will have little effect on the numbers of people who enter into conjugal
relationships – they will simply do so without the imprimatur of the state, or its protections.
66 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (2001).
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be required of couples who lived together for longer periods of time than couples who lived
together for shorter periods, regardless of whether the couple had made some formal
commitment to stay together.
In my view, however, eliminating a civil route for formalizing relationships would be a
mistake for two reasons. First, this formalization helps to identify the intent of its members and
their own understandings with respect to the intended primacy and permanency of the
relationship. And surely such understandings should be relevant to determining the default rules
that apply to the particular relationship. For example, a commitment to a permanent relationship,
such as the entry into marriage serves today, should be pertinent to the state’s determination of
how long income should be redistributed between parties who have separated. Second, as the
Council of Families recognizes, the state’s making available a route through which citizens can
formally commit to the permanency and depth of their relationship serves the state’s goal of
increasing the stability of adult caretaking relationships. Such commitments increase the
likelihood that those participants who face tough times will try harder to weather the difficulty
with their partners.67
B. State Privileging Of (Some) Adult-Adult Relationships
I have argued that the state should recognize relationships between adults and impose, at
the least, default rights and responsibilities among participants in such relationships for the
purpose of seeking to ensure equality and fairness. The issue of whether the state may and
should seek to privilege such relationships over others is a much tougher issue for a liberal
democracy. In my view, the answer should be “yes” because of the goods that these
relationships further. These privileges, however, must be limited in particular ways since they
67 See Bruce Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy – Balancing the Individual
and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 476-84 (1983).
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raise tensions among important liberal goods and values. Part of the challenge of a more robust
liberalism that recognizes a richer diversity of goods must be to seek a course of action that
ameliorates the tensions among these varied goods. In what follows, I set out four principles for
the state’s treatment of adults’ relationships that, together, seek to accomplish this purpose.
1. Freedom to enter into consensual relationships
First, liberalism’s great respect for individuals’ forming and carrying out their own life
plans requires that the state allow individuals the freedom to engage – or not engage – in
consensual relationships with others. The right to determine one’s own personal relationships is
central to liberalism’s respect for individual self-determination. The fact that liberalism was
born out of fear of tyranny, as Judith Shklar points out, 68 strongly militates against the state
decreeing that some consensual relationships are permissible and others are not. John Stuart
Mill’s counsel that society benefits from allowing different “experiments of living” to flourish
also supports the state’s ensuring that such freedom exists.69 Under this principle, for example, a
citizen whose vision of the good life is to have sexual relationships with as many other citizens
as possible should be able to fulfill that vision without interference by the state (barring issues
such as public health concerns), regardless of whether the majority’s own private views of
morality condemn such action.
2. Encouragement of (a broad range of) long-term caretaking
relationships
Second, although the liberal state must tolerate all consensual relationships, it need not
give all such relationships a level playing field. It is true, as Fineman and Warner argue, that the
68 See Judith Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 37 (N.L. Rosenblum, ed. 1989).
69 See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER (John Gray ed., 1991).
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liberal democratic state should not favor some relationships over others based on citizens’
private notions of morality. It can and should, however, seek to support relationships that further
important public goods in which the liberal state has a legitimate interest. Among the most
important of these is caretaking. Without minimizing the harm that can occur in relationships
between adults, or ignoring the sex inequality that tends to mark heterosexual relationships, the
crux of the matter is that dependency is an inevitable fact of life for adults as well as children,
and a liberal state must contend with that fact. Because of its interest in the health, well-being,
and dignity of its citizens, the liberal state has a vital interest in the success of long-term
relationships, and should provide these relationships with the institutional support that will help
them flourish.
Given that the state’s interest is in caretaking, the category of relationships that the state
has an interest in supporting is considerably broader than the set of couples who are now
formally married. The state has an interest in supporting all long-term intimate relationships in
which caretaking occurs, including relationships of couples who are not necessarily
monogamous, or, at the opposite end of the spectrum, those whose relationships are not sexual.
By the same token, the state also has an interest in supporting caretaking in family groupings that
involve more than two adults.70 Thus, the state has valid reasons to support all of the following
horizontal relationships involving caretaking: a couple of elderly sisters who live together and
take care of one another, a non-monogamous homosexual couple, a commune of five adults who
live together with their children, and a heterosexual married couple.
70 There may be administrative rather than theoretical reasons to limit the number of persons that the state should
recognize. There is, however, no reason that two persons should necessarily be the limit.
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3. Limits on the privileges available to long-term caretaking
relationships
Third, with all that said, promoting the health and stability of horizontal relationships is
only one goal that a flourishing liberal democracy should pursue, and only one of many
principles that should affect the state’s decision-making. State distribution of privileges in favor
of these relationships therefore has to be weighed against alternative principles of distribution,
including distribution based on need. As I pointed out before, considerations of need will often
conflict with distributing privileges to adults in long-term relationships. Further, the recognition
of the limits on the state’s and individuals’ abilities to ensure the existence and stability of
relationships must also be factored into the state’s family policy.
These considerations should cause the state to limit the privileges that support these
relationships in two specific ways. First, the state’s seeking to aid caretaking relationships
between adults cannot undercut the state’s responsibility to ensure that all its citizens have the
means and opportunity to pursue dignified lives. This means, at a minimum, as Martha Fineman
argues, that a just society should seek to deliver basic social goods such as health care to
everyone in society, rather than based on family membership. Insofar as the state distributes
these goods based on marital status, it neglects its most basic responsibilities.
Second, the state should limit privileges for relationships to those tied to the specific
public good in which the state has a legitimate interest – for example, caretaking, or sex
equality.71 Singling out families for more generalized favorable treatment – while it might still
further the goal of supporting families – stands in tension with principles of fairness among all
citizens, both those within and those not in such families, particularly insofar as it redistributes
71 See also FINAL REPORT: BEYOND CONJUGALITY, LAW COMM’N OF CANADA (2004), available at
http://www.lcc.gc.ca/about/conjugality_toc-en.asp (last visited March 15, 2006).
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economic resources to those who are, on average, better off. Under this principle, the state could
allow caretaking leaves from work or special immigration privileges for the partners of citizens,
but not general tax breaks for those in caretaking relationships that are unrelated to the extra
expenses incurred in caretaking. Thus the state would have little justification for funnelling
general economic support to those in adult-adult relationships, given that these adults, on
average, do better financially due to the economies of scale of living together. In contrast,
economic redistribution to caretaker-dependent relationships could be better justified by the
consideration of the cost to caretakers of caring for dependents, including the interruption from
working continuously in the paid work force.
One important way in which the state can legitimately foster relationships among adults
that conform with this principle is to provide a civil route through which adults can formalize
their commitment to others. As Bruce Hafen notes, formal commitments increase the likelihood
that a relationship will last.72 They also serve as an expressive vehicle for the state to announce
its support for stable caretaking relationships without redistributing tangible privileges in favor
of such relationships and, hence, away from those who might need them more. The state’s
endorsing such civil commitments is still not, of course, without cost to those who do not enter
them: to the extent that the state endorses such commitments, those who do not enter into them
may feel a lack of societal respect, or even societal disapprobation. In my view, however, the
benefits that such formalization yields in terms of the stability of these relationships, given the
importance of such relationships, still outweighs the costs of this potential stigmatization.
72 See Bruce Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy – Balancing the Individual
and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 476-84 (1983).
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4. Guarding against injury to other important goods
Fourth, in privileging caretaking relationships between adults, the state must also seek to
remedy the negative consequences to public goods associated with these relationships. Three of
these possible consequences bear particular attention: 1) increased gender inequality, 2)
increased economic inequality, and 3) the possibility that close caretaking relationships will
cause their participants to turn away from civic life, instead of serving as a springboard to
healthy civic engagement. I discuss each in turn.
a. Sex inequality
Any proposals that the state should promote intimate caretaking relationships must deal
with the fact that heterosexual relationships, as well as the institution of marriage, have been
deeply intertwined with women’s continued gender inequality. Leaving current political realities
aside, the state might, of course, deal with this troubling association by privileging only those
long-term caretaking relationships that do not involve heterosexual relationships. Alternatively,
and far more palatable politically, the state could privilege heterosexual relationships along with
other relationships at the same time that it seeks to increase the equality within these
relationships.
One way to pursue this latter goal would be for the state to adopt policies that encouraged
the shared caretaking of children by their parents, since so much gender inequality is associated
with women’s assuming the greater portion of childrearing responsibilities.73 To accomplish this
goal, the state could adopt models of public support for caretaking that encourage men to take an
equal role. For example, requiring that employers adopt family leave policies that can be taken
73 See Katharine Bartlett, Brigitte M. Bodenheimer Memorial Lecture On The Family: Saving the Family from the
Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 844-45 (1998).
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by parents sharing childcare between them, rather than policies that are limited to full-time
caregivers, would encourage shared caretaking, as would flex-time, and allowing both parents of
very young children to work somewhat fewer hours without sacrificing their jobs. Schools, too,
should play a role in this endeavor, teaching children that both fathers and mothers can have
equal roles in nurturing their children, and helping them to understand the importance of these
caretaking tasks. In Anita Shreve’s words, “the old home-economics courses that used to teach
girls how to cook and sew might give way to the new home economics: teaching girls and boys
how to combine work and parenting.”74
b. Economic inequality
Second, with respect to economic equality, the state’s encouraging tighter family ties runs
an increased risk that wealth will be more tightly held within particular families’ hands, and,
therefore, that there will be more disparities of wealth and, consequently, opportunity across
families. What this threat to equality calls for, however, is not state efforts to loosen family ties,
but rather efforts to lessen the disparities of wealth and opportunity that result from these ties.
Lessening these disparities requires that the state seek to ensure that all citizens have the
financial means and education to ensure (at the very least) some basic threshold of opportunity,
even when their families cannot provide this without aid. It also means, at the other end of the
income spectrum, that the state should seek to reduce, although probably not eliminate,
disparities in wealth continuing between generations. As Michael Walzer argues, there are
significant reasons to allow family members to express their love through bequests to family
members, as well as significant reasons to tax these bequests for reasons of equality and funding
74 SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 177 (1989) (quoting ANITA SHREVE, REMAKING
MOTHERHOOD 237 (1987)).
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legitimate state expenditures.75 As Walzer concludes, the state should moderate between these
goals by giving some weight to both when determining the extent of taxation of such gifts.
c. Families as a respite, not an island
The state should also seek to encourage familial relationships to serve as a source of
support, but not be islands unto themselves. As Michelle Barrett and Mary McIntosh point out,
the nuclear family, with its ideal of self-sufficiency, can cause family members to focus so
exclusively on their families that it interferes with the vigorous public life that a healthy liberal
democracy requires.76 To counter the tendency for family members to treat their families as an
island, the state should seek to support the caretaking relationships associated with the nuclear
family at the same time that it seeks at least some deprivatization of this form. The pattern of
childrearing in which parents have sole responsibility for childcare inside a private home isolates
children and caretaking parents from the larger community. In privileging caretaking
relationships, the state should seek to construct institutional arrangements that incorporate
parents and dependents into the life of the community and share caretaking responsibilities
within the community. Tax subsidies for co-housing developments, in which some cooking and
childcare are performed cooperatively, and supports for childcare cooperatives, are two measures
by which the state can pursue this end.
75 See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 128 (1990)(“But surely
the gift is one of the finer expressions of ownership as we know it. And so long as they act within their sphere, we
have every reason to respect those men and women who give their money away to persons they love or to causes to
which they are committed, even if they make distributive outcomes unpredictable and uneven.”).
76 MICHELE BARRETT AND MARY MCINTOSH, THE ANTI-SOCIAL FAMILY 51-52 (1991).
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III. Civil Partnership or Proliferation of Families?
The most difficult issue with respect to how the state should treat adult’s long-term
caretaking relationships is not, in my view, whether or not the state should accord some civil
status to these relationships, or even the issue of whether the state should provide subsidies to
caretaking relationships. As I have said, in my view the answer to each of these questions is
“yes,” in large part because of the importance of caretaking to society. The most difficult issue
is whether all such horizontal relationships should be categorized together for purposes of public
support under a banner such as “domestic partnership,” or whether they should be categorized
separately according to the general type of relationship at issue. In the latter case, the state
would presumably retain a civil status for conjugal relationships such as marriage (which, out of
justice and fairness, as well as for the goods associated with them, would need to be expanded to
same-sex couples), but also recognize other forms of adult-adult relationships, such as domestic
partnerships between friends who cohabitate. This approach, however, runs the risk that marital
relationships will continue to be perceived as superior to other relationships and
disproportionately assigned privileges.
Grouping all adult-adult relationships into a single legal status has the advantage of
guarding against the possibility that any particular subcategory of relationship, namely, marriage,
would be unfairly privileged as against other horizontal relationships. In addition, clustering
different types of horizontal relationships together into the same legal category would send a
strong message that marriage occupies no paramount place in the hierarchy.
There are several downsides to this strategy, however. First, treating these relationships
as a single category would keep the state from tailoring the particular obligations and benefits
assigned to that status to the type of caretaking relationship at issue. For example, when a child
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is born to or adopted by one of the parties within a conjugal relationship, it makes sense to
accord a presumption of parenthood and right to adopt to the other partner. There is less reason
to accord such a presumption in a non-conjugal caretaking relationship, however. The same is
true for inheritance rights: as a default matter, it makes sense to assign a presumption that
conjugal partners intend their partner to inherit (in the absence of agreements to the contrary),
since most individuals in such relationships leave their estates to their partners. It may make less
sense to apply this presumption to other types of long-term caretaking relationships. With that
said, the state could choose to divide relationships into categories for the purpose of delineating
rights between the partners, but to use a single category for purposes of assigning state support.
Second, although moving away from the category of marriage has the benefit of
eliminating marriage as the privileged category, it has the related disadvantage that much of the
positive cultural resonance associated with marriage – the notion that the institution is a serious,
long-term bond of commitment based on love between two people who come together and take
one another permanently as family – will also be lost.77 To the extent that laws have an
expressive force to which citizens respond, eliminating marriage would weaken the resolve of
those in relationships to work through rough periods. It could also dissuade those who would
otherwise have married from entering into domestic partnerships, since such partnerships do not
have the same cultural resonance that swearing one’s love through marriage does. This could
leave many of those made vulnerable by relationships without legal protection.
77 See supra note 62.
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At the level of theory, in my view, there is no clear winner between these two alternatives
– each has its own set of benefits and costs.78 At the level of political reality, though, the popular
ideology (not to mention the $50 billion a year wedding industry)79 is so invested in the value of
marriage that eliminating civil marriage is well nigh impossible. As a result, those who seek to
topple marriage from its pedestal as the preferred form of family and to increase the equity
among different forms of relationships would likely do better to focus their attention on
decentering marriage by proliferating other categories of status relationships among adults, rather
than seeking to eliminate marriage as a civil status and replacing it by a civil partnership
category.80 This strategy of broadening the categories of relationships that receive legal
protections and support, and distributing a subset of the bundle of rights now received by
marriage among these different relationships,81 is not only the most pragmatic course to take
given existing political realities, but a course that offers significant promise in furthering the
goods that a liberal democracy needs to flourish. Disaggregating the privileges awarded based
on the good at issue also helps deconstruct the monolithic notion of “The Family,” and the
orthodoxy surrounding it. This approach makes it clear that there are many kinds of
relationships that contribute many different public goods, and that no one-size-fits-all family is
the ideal.
78 As a result of the difficulty of this issue, Mary Shanley recently shifted positions, first arguing that the state
should continue to support civil marriage, see SHANLEY, supra note 16, and more recently arguing that the state
should discard civil marriage and treat all horizontal relationships as domestic partnerships. See id.
79 Dina ElBoghdady, For Love and Money; Amid Economic Sickness, Bridal Industry Radiates Health, WASH.
POST, May 25, 2003, at F1.
80 See Judith Stacey, The New Family Value Crusaders, THE NATION, July 25, 1994; McClain, supra note 40, at 391,
401-02.
81 See Iris Marion Young, Reflections on the Family in the Age of Murphy Brown: On Gender, Justice, and
Sexuality, in REVISIONING THE POLITICAL: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN WESTERN
POLITICAL THEORY 258 (Nancy J. Hirschmann and Christine DiStefano eds., 1996); James DiFonzo, Unbundling
Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 31, 65-66 (2003).
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IV. Difficult Cases: Encouraging the Two-Parent Family and Encouraging Marriage
I have argued that the state has a legitimate interest in preferring two-parent (or more)
families over single-parent families where children are involved. However, the thorny issue of
how the state should seek to encourage two-parent families merits additional discussion. As I
have argued elsewhere,82 the state has a duty to ensure that children have the caretaking and
other resources necessary to support their well-being and develop their capabilities. This duty
exists, whether or not the state believes that parents have made a wise choice about their family
form, and even if the state fears that ensuring that today’s children have necessary resources will
send the wrong signals about better and worse family forms and therefore hurt future children;
the duty to support the existing children is paramount. For these reasons, it is illegitimate for the
state to withhold welfare benefits to low-income families based on the mother’s having
additional children out if wedlock, if doing so would deprive the children in these families of
necessary resources.
Above this required threshold of support, however, the state does have legitimate reasons
to adopt measures that encourage two parent families. In doing so, however, the state should
seek to harmonize the important liberal goods at stake. In other words, the state’s goal should be
to construct policies that avoid zero-sum situations in which furthering some goods operates to
the detriment of others. Developing such policies will, however, require careful attention to the
ways in which relevant goods may conflict. By this criterion, the state’s seeking to further two-
parent families by awarding them economic resources not awarded to single-parent families is a
peculiarly bad tool to harmonize these goods. Not only would doing so keep resources from the
82 Maxine Eichner, Dependency and the Liberal Polity: On Martha Fineman’s The Autonomy Myth, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 1285 (2005).
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very families who need them most, it also risks stigmatizing the very children who are most
vulnerable. Far better would be measures that do not pose such a stark tradeoff among goods.
Thus the state would do better, for example, to achieve this end through job training programs
and educational subsidies for youths who are at risk of becoming parents, since studies show that
increasing the prospects for young adults’ future makes it significantly less likely that they will
bear children while they are young and single.83 Such programs do not pit the important interests
of current children against the important interests of future children.
The state should deal in a similar manner with proposals to shore up the institution of
marriage (or whatever categories of adult-adult relationships that the state retains). Proponents
of marriage have proposed a number of policies recently to strengthen marriage, including
making divorce more difficult through returning to fault divorce laws, adopting covenant
marriage provisions, premarital counseling, and even awarding bonuses for marriages where no
pre-marital abortions occurred.84 In choosing policies to strengthen the health and permanency
of horizontal relationships, the state should here, too, seek to avoid policies that require large
tradeoffs between important goods. In this light, tightening up divorce laws through a return to
fault divorce, despite furthering the state’s interest in promoting marriage, severely infringes on
citizens’ autonomy interests.85 The state would therefore do better to adopt proposals such as
83 MARION WRIGHT EDELMAN, FAMILIES IN PERIL: AN AGENDA FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 88 (1988).
84 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-901 to 25-906 (2000 & Supp. 2004); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-11-801 to 9-11-811
(2002 & Supp. 2003);La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:272 to 9:276 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (covenant marriage
provisions).See also Missouri House Bill 1917, LR # 3769-01 (1999)(proposing that couples who marry after
attaining the age of 21, without having had any children or (in the woman’s case) any premarital abortions, and
having tested negative for STD’s, be paid $1000 from a fund, which would be raised by assessing a $1000 fee
against parties whose actions provided the grounds for a divorce).
85 Covenant marriage laws, in which individuals getting married can choose whether or not heightened standards
will apply at divorce, pose less of a conflict among important goods. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§25-901 to 25-906 (2000
& Supp. 2004); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-11-801 to 9-11-811 (2002 & Supp. 2003); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:272 to
9:276 (2000 & Supp. 2005)). Given the small number of couples who choose to enter into covenant marriage where
it is available, though, as well as the problems with requiring parties to remain in a marriage that one party wants to
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pre-marital counseling requirements that would avoid this stark tradeoff of goods. Further, given
that women more often seek divorces than men, as Katharine Bartlett points out,86 the state could
usefully support such relationships by encouraging men to be better partners through assuming
an equal share of housework and carework.87 Such measures would infringe less on individual’s
autonomy than stricter divorce laws and, at the same time, increase sex equality.
In determining the measures that the state should take to further such relationships, it is
important to keep in mind the limits of the state’s institutional competence to deal with the
complexities of these relationships. The state can make it more difficult for individuals to get
out of marriage. It cannot, however, keep affection and caretaking alive within such
relationships.88 As I argued before, this recognition of the state’s inherent lack of institutional
capacity, as well as limits on citizens’ own capacities in this area, should cause the state to limit
benefits awarded to families out of concern for individual fairness. It should also cause the state
to investigate means to encourage alternative caretaking networks for those who are not, either
exit, the state would be wise to seek alternative policies. In Louisiana, two percent; in Arizona, 0.25 percent; and in
Arkansas, only 71 out of approximately 38,000 marrying couples elected the covenant marriage. SCOTT
DREWIANKA, CIVIL UNIONS AND COVENANT MARRIAGE: THE ECONOMICS OF REFORMING MARITAL INSTITUTIONS
(2003).
86 Bartlett cites figures from a 1986 study which indicate that women initiate divorce in 62 to 67 percent of cases.
Bartlett, supra note 65, at 842 n.135. A more recent study gives approximately the same result, placing the figure at
70 percent. Margaret Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, ‘These Boots Are Made for Walking’: Why Most Divorce Filers
Are Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126, 127-28 (2000).
87 See Bartlett, supra note 65, at 842. More recent data indicates that women still do an average of 17.5 hours of
housework per week, while men do an average of 10. JAMES A. SWEET AND LARRY L. BUMPASS, CENTER FOR
DEMOGRAPHY AND ECOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON, THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILIES AND
HOUSEHOLDS - WAVES 1 AND 2: DATA DESCRIPTION AND DOCUMENTATION, available at
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/nsfh/home.htm (last visited December 20, 2005).
88 The difficulties associated with the state’s promotion of marriage, for example, were made eminently clear in
President G.W. Bush’s recent plan to promote marriage for women on welfare. Despite the administrations $1.5
billion initiative, the administration had no clear plan for how states might successfully promote marriage once
Wade Horn, the top official at Health and Human Services, withdrew his earlier proposal to award those who
married with cash bonuses. See Barbara Ehrenreich, Editorial, Let Them Eat Wedding Cake, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2004, §4, at 13.
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through chance or choice, members of intimate relationships, such as “mothers houses,” where
single parents can raise their children more communally, or the types of informal networks
among friends that helped provide caretaking for men in the gay community stricken with AIDS
in San Francisco at the height of the epidemic.
Conclusion
Given how contentious a legal and political issue marriage has become, it should not be
surprising that the state’s position with respect to marriage and other relationships among adults
implicates so many, and such conflicting, goods and principles important to a liberal democracy.
For this reason, determining the appropriate stance of the state to these relationships cannot be
accomplished by looking to only one or two of the relevant factors at stake. To do so, as Indian
folklore tells us, would be to take one part of the elephant for the whole.
